Theory and Blockchain Lab
Our team are interested in a broad range of problems from a theoretical aspect, such as algorithmic game theory, mechanism design, algorithms, blockchain consensus protocols, blockchain economics, blockchain security, smart contracts, etc.
Meet the Team
Faculty
Post-Docs
PhD Students
Visiting Students
Zifan Gong 龚子凡
Visiting Students
Sven Schwieger
Visiting Students
Ruiheng Sun 孙瑞恒
Visiting Students
Publications
An Improved Upper Bound for the Random-Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade via Recursive Hard Instances.
arXiv preprint,
2026.
Scalable Composition of Byzantine Agreements under Reorder Attacks.
arXiv preprint,
2026.
Decentralized Bandits without Global Clock for Dynamic Matching Market.
In 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML),
2026.
Federated Learning with Free-Riding in a Duopoly Market.
In Mechanism Design in Social Networks, IJCAI, Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 2777,
2025.
Composable Byzantine Agreements with Reorder Attacks.
In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), Vol. 354, pp. 13:1-13:23,
2025.